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The mass media has been credited as being an agent of political socialization among the 
Canadian public. Representations of varying cultural identities in the media allow us to 
understand how the nation perceives selected ethnic groups as well as the perception of its own 
national image. Messages produced by the media construct and inform the public imagination 
and influence the lives of those that fall under the umbrella term ethnic minority. Canadian mass 
media has stereotypically represented racialized groups as deviant or problem citizens (Jiwani, 
2010).  Since the media can be viewed as a public sphere where citizens discuss current issues, if 
particular groups are consistently represented as criminals and problem minorities they can 
effectively feel a sense of isolation and a curtailing of their rights (Jiwani, 2010).  This paper 
examines how Canadian mass media has represented Tamil-Canadian identity, particularly 
during the infamous 2009 Tamil protests. Protests were rooted in demands from the Tamil 
community for the Canadian government to put pressure on the Sri Lankan government to end 
state sponsored violence against Tamils. These protests included the blockade of the Gardiner 
Expressway in Toronto as well as human chain demonstrations around various consulates in 
Toronto and Ottawa (Godwin 2012). An argument will be made that Tamils were represented 
negatively in the media due to the perceived relationship between many Tamils and the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam organization (LTTE), which was deemed a terrorist group by 
the Conservative government in 2006 (Godwin, 2012). As such, Tamil identity became 
synonymous with terrorism which portrayed Tamil-Canadians as not only unworthy and 
troublesome citizens, but as a national security issue and a threat to Canadian nationhood. 
Therefore their protest claims were deemed illegitimate by much of the Canadian public.   
Tamil identity has become marginalized within the Canadian multicultural framework. 
This is due to the prevailing post-9/11 security discourse which has constructed Tamils as 
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terrorists or terrorist supporters and has restricted their sense of belonging as citizens. This 
discourse has also been normalized within the mass media, which has provided limited context 
of the Tamil struggles in Sri Lanka, as well as the rationale for Tamil-Canadian protests (George, 
2011). It is important to examine the Tamil-Canadian dilemma because outside of Sri Lanka, 
Canada – specifically Toronto – is home to the largest Tamil diaspora. However, refugee claims 
of Tamils trying to enter Canada are now structured within a ‘national security’ discourse which 
has negatively impacted immigration policies towards Tamils (George, 2011). Media 
representation has further influenced the public perception of the worthiness of Tamil refugees 
and has informed the politics of belonging for Tamil-Canadians.  
This paper will first provide an historical background of the Sri Lankan civil war and 
mass exodus of Tamils and subsequent influx of Tamil refugees to Canada. Following there will 
be a discussion of Canadian news coverage of the Tamil/Sri Lankan problem from a foreign 
news angle during 2008-2009. Next, there will be an analysis of media coverage of the 2009 
Tamil demonstrations in Toronto, which will be supported by excerpts from various newspaper 
sources. There will then be an analysis of how media discourse throughout the demonstrations 
influenced the inclusiveness of Tamils within a multicultural framework. Finally, there will be a 
discussion of how Tamil refugees are recognized due to popular and national discourse. 
Comparative examples of media depictions regarding Tamil refugees arriving to Canada will be 
provided. Those who arrived in Newfoundland in 1986 were viewed as legitimate refugee 
claims, as opposed to the 2009 Tamil refugee claims of those who arrived in British Columbia, 
which was viewed as illegitimate.  
Though Tamil migration to Canada started as early as the 1950s, the breakout of a civil 
war in Sri Lanka in 1983 between Tamil and Singhalese citizens resulted in a rise of Tamil 
migration to Canada (Wayland, 2003). Historically, Tamils have been concentrated in northern 
Sri Lanka and are typically the educated, upper class members of society. This was due to British 
colonial presence in the region that gave Tamils access to colonial missionary schools before 
independence in 1948 (Wayland, 2003).  As such, Tamils held almost all professional and civil 
service jobs in the country until a change of government dominated by the Singhalese ethnic 
group led the government to resolve Tamil hierarchy within Sri Lankan society. Unfortunately, 
this was enacted through mass genocide and exodus of Tamil Sri Lankans, notably during the 
infamous ‘Black July’ incident when anti-Tamil riots in the capital of Colombo destroyed Tamil 
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property and killed nearly three thousand Tamils (Wayland 2003). Between 1984 and 1992 alone 
an estimated twenty-five thousand Tamil migrants came to Canada, many of whom settled in 
Toronto (La, 2004). Tamils in Canada have supported various political organizations abroad such 
as the LTTE and the People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam since the 1980s. The 
more highly publicized LTTE is a Tamil insurgency organization that actively fights for the 
autonomy and separation of northern Sri Lanka as a Tamil state (La, 2004). In Toronto, there 
have been various rallies mobilized by Tamils such as the pro-LTTE rally in June of 1995 which 
became the third largest demonstration by a visible minority group in Torontonian history. 
During the fiftieth anniversary of Sri Lankan independence in February 1
st
 1998, nearly twenty 
thousand Tamils rallied around Queen’s Park to protest Tamil state sponsored violence against 
Tamils by the Sri Lankan government (Wayland, 2003). Tamil-Canadians finance many of these 
organizations which they stress are for the purpose of relief of those suffering in Sri Lanka. For 
many Tamils the LTTE and its sister organizations are nationalist movements that fight for the 
interests of Tamil peoples. However, many Canadian political figures have tried to link the Tamil 
diaspora to funding the LTTE to purchase weapons. Other public officials have argued that 
members of the Tamil diaspora feel forced and are even blackmailed into sending money to the 
LTTE (La 2004). Indeed, there have been reports of the group enlisting tactics such as suicide 
bombings, political assassination and the use of child soldiers to fight for their cause (La 2004). 
Yet the wrongful association of Tamil Tigers as terrorists, and Tamils as Tigers, has created 
issues for Tamil-Canadians. 
Canadian foreign news coverage of the third world places minorities within the 
framework of “negativity as criteria for newsworthiness” (Fleras & Kunz, 2001, p.65). 
Mainstream media regularly depicts the third world as embodied by crisis, genocide and 
dictatorships. In the case of the Tamil, media coverage of the civil war in Sri Lanka portrayed the 
Tamil genocide as a result of the inherently violent nature of the Singhalese and Tamil people, 
which reinforced the stereotype of the ethnically deviant ‘other’ (George, 2011). During the 
2008-2009 periods various global news services, including Canadian ones, reported on the 
ongoing tensions between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. However, much of the 
content was geared towards those living in LTTE territory with flashing images of malnourished, 
wounded and murdered Tamils (George, 2011). Reporters made claims that the LTTE was 
inflicting violence on not only Singhalese but Tamil citizens, with accusations that the 
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organization prevented people from leaving LTTE territory and used innocent Tamil civilians as 
human shields (George, 2011). These reports placed the LTTE, and hence those that were seen as 
supporters, as dangerous criminals. This informed global reactions towards Sri Lankan conflict, 
which placed the LTTE as the responsible party for the devastation of the war.  It also puts into 
context how Canadians access knowledge and perceives circumstances of minorities in Canada 
as well as in the developing world as mainstream media provides a substantial amount of 
knowledge (Fleras & Kunz, 2001).  Rather than educate the public of the context behind foreign 
news coverage, the goal is to provide news content that will thrill audiences with sensational 
images of misery and overall destitute societies around the world because this is newsworthy and 
therefore profitable (Fleras & Kunz, 2001). 
The intensification of the war mobilized Tamils in the diaspora to raise awareness of the 
violence against Tamils by the Sri Lankan government. The Tamil-Canadian community 
organized protests in Toronto and Ottawa which included the illegal blockade of the Gardiner 
Expressway as well as coordinated human chain demonstrations around the Canadian, American 
and Sri Lankan consulates (Godwin, 2012). Tamil demonstrators had various demands, which 
included that the Canadian government put pressure on the Sri Lankan government to call for a 
ceasefire against Tamils and for the trial of the Sri Lankan government and military under the 
International Coordinating Committee of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection 
of Human Rights (Godwin, 2012). They also wanted an independent Tamil state and for the 
Canadian government to reverse its decision to declare the LTTE a terrorist organization. 
Although there was some sympathy for the plight of Tamils, public perceptions of the 
demonstrations was met with distress, particularly due to the Gardiner blockade, which 
discredited the perception of Tamils as victims worthy of Canadian support (Godwin, 2012).  
Coverage of Tamil demonstrations in Canada in the Toronto Star, Globe and Mail and the 
National Post from January to June of 2009 was characterized by two prevailing discourses. First 
was the correlation between Tamil identity and terrorism, and second the cultural norms of 
Canadian identity and belonging (Sriskandarajah, 2010). The National Post and the Globe and 
Mail were mostly unsympathetic towards Tamil plight and provided little explanation of the 
rationale of Tamil protestors. The Toronto Star was at first sympathetic towards the protestors, 
providing some such context.  However, towards the end, Toronto Star’s coverage of the protests 
was backed with minimal background of the issues and ultimately reflected negative anti-
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terrorist discourse (Sriskandarajah, 2010). In an editorial piece published by the Globe and Mail 
on May 1
st
, 2009 it was noted that:  
 
“[I] s the U.S. likely to alter its foreign policy because Tamils in Toronto protest 
outside their consulate? Not likely-especially since many waved the flags of the 
Tigers, a listed terrorist organization. It appears to have escaped the notice of 
demonstration organizers, but the U.S. does not look kindly on terrorist 
sympathizers” (p. 16) 
 
In the National Post on May 15
th
, 2009 John Mraz wrote:  
 
“The Tamil protests around the globe demanding international intervention in Sri 
Lanka have been a compelling sight. The Tigers’ red flags have symbolized the 
movement. That flag is potent semiotic, with crossed rifles and ammunition 
behind a big striped carnivore. Not symbols of peace, no matter how peaceful 
some of the protests have been” (p. 12). 
 
The Toronto Star took a somewhat compassionate stance on the issue; however, Tamils were still 
misrepresented in the published piece. Martin Regg Cohn on May 26
th
 2009 wrote:  
 
“There’s nothing wrong with lending our ear, and our empathy, to the estimated 
200,000 Tamils who have settled in Canada and are overwhelmed by the plight of 
loved ones still in Sri Lanka. But that doesn’t make it right for Tamils to impose 
roadblocks and wave Tiger flags as a way of pressuring Canadians to support 
Tamil independence, any more than one would tolerate Sikh separatists blocking 
University Ave” (p.23) 
 
 
Tamil identity and Tiger identity became synonymous throughout these newspapers. Tamils 
were automatically assumed to be Tigers, and therefore terrorists or terrorist supporters. Each of 
the newspapers presented Tamils as having no genuine reason to protest, having no respect for 
Canadian laws, and as destructive mobs rather than peaceful protestors.  Thus, their rights to use 
public space for their political desires became contested (Sriskandarajah, 2010). Each of the 
newspapers also portrayed symbols such as the Tamil Eelam flag as synonymous with the Tamil 
Tigers. The Tamil Eelam flag represents Tamil nationality and the desire for a separate Tamil 
state in Sri Lanka. Yet in the media the flag is a symbol of the LTTE and therefore terrorism 
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(Srisjandarajah, 2010). None of the newspapers provided much indication of what the flag meant 
to Tamils or if it was exclusively an LTTE flag. Also, the views of Tamil-Canadian’s on the flag 
were missing from news reports. While all Tamils view the flag as a representation of Tamil 
identity, only some equate it as a symbol of the Tamil Tigers. These people do so not because 
they view the LTTE as a terrorist organization, but because they feel they are the only group that 
voices their opinion (Srisjandarajah 2010). 
In relation to the second discourse of how Canadian national identity is constructed in 
mass media, “national identity is produced through processes in which an ‘other’ is created in 
which to define the national identity against” (Sriskandarajah, 2010, p.39). Tamils become 
‘othered’ by association with terrorism. Consequently, Tamils are unsuited to be integrated into 
Canadian national belonging.  The actions of Tamil protestors were deemed as lacking Canadian 
social values, as if they were resorting to un-Canadian behaviour. It was noted in an editorial 
piece in the National Post “while staging non-violent protest marches is well within the Canadian 
political tradition, convening a mob to praise an illegal terrorist organization is not” (Editorial, 
2009, p.16). There was also limited reference to whether the Tamils themselves thought of the 
LTTE as a terrorist group or as freedom fighters; instead, the protests were framed in a way to 
characterize Tamils as illegitimate and adverse to Canadian values. Thus, the media effectively 
influences the representation of Tamil identity as a betrayal of Canadian identity (Sriskandarajah, 
2010). Further, Tamil voices were consistently marginalized in relation to ‘Canadian’ voices. 
Tamils were for the most part indirectly quoted throughout each of the newspapers while non-
Tamil Canadians were quoted directly by reporters. The views of Tamils were set by the 
reporters, while the thoughts of ‘Canadians’ were validated through direct investigative reporting 
and quotation (Sriskandarajah, 2010). 
Given that Tamil identity has been constructed as a threat to Canadian values, there is an 
inconsistency in the relationship between Tamil-Canadians and the national multicultural 
framework. Accusations of terrorism have created issues for immigrants in Canada, especially 
post-9/11. Many people who have migrated from countries that have been placed under terrorist 
watch have had their political identity and national loyalty questioned (Thurairajah, 2011). 
Mainstream media has further influenced the restrictions of inclusiveness for immigrants. 
Despite Canada’s multicultural agenda, the way the media presents news about Tamils creates 
cultural anxiety among Canadians, which limits the ability of Tamils to exercise their cultural 
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and political beliefs, as they are viewed as illegitimate (Thurairajah, 2011). Tamils have the 
dilemma of defending their Canadian identity and loyalty while facing allegations of terrorist 
activities. For example, as Canadian citizens, Tamils have the right to form lobbies in order to try 
and influence Canadian foreign policy that impact Sri Lanka. Also, Tamils in Canada had 
financed and supported the secessionist goals of the LTTE for years with minimal negative 
media attention (Thurairajah, 2011). However, once the LTTE was officially deemed a terrorist 
organization by the Canadian government in 2006, the media characterized Tamil lobbyists and 
LTTE supporters as pro-terrorist. Tamils were viewed as betraying their allegiance to Canada 
(Thurairajah 2011). Popular discourse of Tamils provided limited space for inclusion into 
Canadian multicultural discourse. The terms of belonging were positioned within the regulations 
of perceived national security threats (Thurairajah 2011). Inevitably, “Tamil identity became 
frozen, overdetermined by national security discourses and the focus of the diaspora itself on the 
opposing sides of the Sri Lankan civil war” (George, 2011, p.467). Canadian mass media 
reflected these views by questioning the legitimacy of not only the Tamil conflict in Sri Lanka, 
but of deeming Tamil identity as invalid in Canadian society.  
 Popular discourse surrounding Tamils has also influenced public perception of Tamil 
refugees. Historically, Canada has had a strong national tradition of granting asylum and refugee 
status to those who meet the conditions outlined in the Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees of 1951 (Mann, 2009). Part of Canada’s goal was the commitment to provide asylum 
for persons fleeing wrongful persecution in their home country. In 2009, the notion of the Tamil 
refugee was replaced with the image of an illegal immigrant. Immigrants that are accused of 
illegally landing in Canada are perceived as threats and unworthy of Canadian asylum. Refugees 
that arrive by boat as opposed to other means of transportations have typically attracted immense 
public response. Mann (2009) notes, “refugees that arrive by boat gain a disproportionate amount 
of media attention, considering that they represent only a small percentage of asylum seekers 
who enter Canada by illegal means” (p.192). Two incidents of Tamils arriving to Canada by boat 
will be described to display the prevailing public opinion surrounding Tamil refugees from two 
different points in Canadian history.  
On August 11
th
 1986, 155 Tamil women, men, and children were rescued off the coast of 
Newfoundland. Immediately after arriving to Canada, the refugees were issued one-year permits 
as asylum seekers, which allowed them to work and live in Canada with the right to apply for 
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refugee protection, or renew the permit at the end of the year (Mann 2009). Seeing as Canada 
had recently became a signatory of the Refugee Convention and was awarded the Nansen medal 
for its efforts in protecting refugees by the United Nations in 1986, discourse surrounding 
refugee policies was placed within a context of humanitarian commitment (Mann 2009). During 
this time period, the public and politicians viewed the Tamil asylum seekers as worthy of 
Canadian assistance. The arrival of Tamil refugees was placed within the legal and moral 
commitment to protect refugees. This is not to say that there was not a security investigation to 
determine whether any of the refugees could be related to a terrorist organization, but Tamils 
were assumed innocent until proven guilty (Mann 2009). Tamils were prioritized as refugees 
rather than as potential terrorists.     
In 2009, when the Ocean Lady arrived off the coast of British Columbia with 76 Tamil 
men, the passengers were taken into custody for routine interviews and medical examinations 
before being placed in a detention facility in Vancouver. Many of the men indicated that they 
intended to claim refugee status but were taken into custody due to the lack of documentation 
that deemed them as flight risks (Krishnamurti 2012). The men were held in custody longer than 
the forty-eight hours without a detention review as outlined by the s.57(1) Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act. Fifty of the men were not released until December 2009 and even later 
for the remaining twenty-six (Krishnamurti 2012). In contrast to the 1986 arrival of Tamil 
refugees, the men who arrived on the Ocean Lady were characterized as criminals who were a 
threat to national security within media discourse. Even though the Ocean Lady passengers held 
the legal right to claim refugee status, they were publicly deemed as illegitimate refugees 
(Krishnamurti 2012). The shift towards stronger security discourse in light of 9/11 was no longer 
second to humanitarian protection and the belief of innocence until proven guilty diminished. In 
the media, Tamils were automatically a “threat until established they were not” (Mann, 2009, 
p.202).  
The media also shaped a public image of those that arrived on the Ocean Lady as illegal 
migrants. These attitudes reflect the shifts in security discourse that have influenced immigration 
and refugee policies (Krishnamurti 2012). Further, the relationship between news coverage, 
political commentary and the public indicates how Canadians responded to the Ocean Lady. For 
example, Conservative MP Monte Solberg provided a statement to a Sun Media outlet, claiming 
immigrants that patiently and legally wait to enter Canada have to suffer as they “now have to 
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wait a little bit longer while the Tamils are fed, clothed and housed. I should know. I served as 
Canada’s minister of immigration” (cited in Krishnamurti, 2012, p.146). A political figure 
providing such a statement through the media legitimized the idea among Canadians that Tamils 
were illegal migrants, taking advantage of social services and resources that should be given to 
immigrants who have applied legally to enter the country. No context is provided in the reality of 
what Tamil refugees face once they arrive in Canada, which includes detention and social 
exclusion. It is not an easy process where they are handed basic social rights (Krishnamurti 
2012). The reluctance to admit Sri Lankan refugees into Canada in the last few years is not the 
fault of the media, but it is important to note the influence of popular discourse on public 
perception of Tamil migration and refugee claims. Canadians do not feel guilty for wanting to 
turn away Tamil refugees because according to popular imagery Tamils are not legitimate 
victims (Krishnamurti 2012). 
In conclusion, the sheer number of Tamil immigrants and refugees in Canada make it 
imperative to understand how the media, and broader society, perceive Tamil identity and how 
this ultimately influences the politics of belonging for Tamil-Canadians. The relationship 
between Canadian media institutions and its political functions have shaped interpretations and 
assumptions of Tamils in Canadian society. The alleged association between Tamils and Tigers 
(terrorists) has placed them outside of Canadian social norms, constructing them as undesirable 
citizens. Canadian foreign news coverage of the Sri Lankan civil war has inevitably influenced 
how Tamils are viewed by the Canadian public. In view of the fact that media coverage of the 
conflict stereotyped Tamils and the LTTE as inherently violent criminals, it reinforced the 
ideology of ethnic minorities as socially deviant others, contrasted with normalized Western 
cultures. The perpetuation of these biases through distorted media representation has had 
negative consequences for Tamil-Canadian communities and their ability to participate in 
domestic as well as transnational politics (George 2011). In respect to the protests of the 
Gardiner Expressway, although the demonstrations were illegal it is likely that if a group of 
white Canadian citizens used the same tactics their national loyalty would not have been 
contested in the same way. Furthermore, the Tamil case provides an analysis of shifting national 
discourse in relation to immigration and refugee polices. Canada once prided itself on being a 
peacekeeping nation with open arms for refugees around the world. However, since 9/11 we 
have seen a dramatic change in how minorities are incorporated- or excluded, in nation building. 
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According to Canadian media, threats to the nation are likely to originate in the developing 
world, and therefore from ethnic minorities. These biases inform the social consciousness of 
Canadian citizens.  
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